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MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("President's
Commission" or "Commission"), in its report on Making Health Care
Decisions ("Report"),l proclaimed its underlying message in memora-
ble words:
[T]he Commission attempts to shift the terms of the discussion to-
ward how to foster a relationship between patients and profession-
als characterized by mutual participation and respect and by shared
decisionmaking. The Commission believes such a shift in focus
will do better justice to the realities of health care and to the ethical
values underlying the informed consent doctrine.2
Such sentiments constitute a bold move to imprint on physicians, pa-
tients, and society the Commission's moral vision of how doctors and
patients should make joint decisions in the future.
I have nothing but admiration for the Commission's remarkable
vision, which is so contrary to the medical profession's view of how
physicians and patients should converse with one another. Being
deeply committed to the Commission's vision, I cannot improve on its
sentiments. I can expand, however, on the enormity of the task that
confronts physicians and patients if the Commission's noble aspira-
tions are to be attained.
The writers of the Report were, of course, aware of the problems
I shall discuss, but they did not address them as forthrightly as they
deserve to be addressed. Thus, what I have to say should be read as a
concurring opinion to a Report that seeks to radically alter traditional
patterns of physician-patient decisionmaking.3
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1 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions: A Report On the Ethical and Legal
Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship (1982) [hereinafter
cited as President's Commission].
2 I President's Commission, supra note I, at 36 (emphasis added).
3 Physicians have always maintained that patients are only in need of caring cus-
tody. Doctors felt that in order to accomplish that objective they were obligated to
attend to their patients' physical and emotional needs and to do so on their own
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In reflecting on the Report, I wondered whether the Commis-
sion, aware of the audacity of its objectives, tried to blunt and hide the
revolutionary implications of its vision. If I am correct, this is my
only criticism of the Report.
The Commission correctly observed "that [its] conclusions ...
will not be simple to achieve."4 Yet, at the same time, it also asserted
"that a number of relatively simple changes in practice could facilitate
patient participation in health care decisionmaking."5 Thus, the
Commission appreciated the enormity of the effort that any reason-
able implementation of its vision would entail, yet immediately denied
this reality by glossing over the current low state of shared physician-
patient decisionmaking.6 This is evidenced by the prominence the
Commission gave to the findings of the Harris poll,7 which painted a
rosy picture of the current state of physician-patient decisionmaking.8
Indeed, if the Harris poll is to be believed, then all is well and a much
shorter report would have sufficed, for the Harris poll suggests that
the world of the doctor and patient is not as silent as I believe it to be.
The President's Commission should have given greater weight to
the observational studies it had also commissioned,9 particularly to
the perceptive studies conducted by Professors Lidz and Meisel. 10
They were correct, I believe, in concluding that:
[1) "Disclosure" does not typically occur. Rather patients learn
various bits of information, some relevant to decisionmaking, some
not, from doctors' and nurses' efforts to obtain compliance and
from "situational etiquette."
authority, without consulting with their patients about the decisions that needed to
be made. Indeed, doctors intuitively believed that such consultations were inimi-
cal to good patient care. The idea that patients may also be entitled to liberty, to
sharing the burdens of decision with their doctors, was never part of the ethos of
medicine.
J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 2 (1984). For a historical review of physi-
cians' attitudes toward decisionmaking with patients, see id. at 1-29.
4 I President's Commission, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis added).
SId. at 4 (emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., J. Katz, supra note 3, at 90-103 (The Story of Iphigenia); id. at 131-41 (The
First Two Heart Transplant Patients).
7 "Louis Harris and Associates conducted parallel national surveys of physicians and the
public regarding their attitudes toward, experiences with, and knowledge of informed consent,
disclosure of information, and decisional authority in medical care." 1 President's Commis-
sion, supra note 1, at 8. The results of the Harris poll are reproduced in their entirety in 2
President's Commission, supra note 1, at 17-316.
8 See, e.g., infra note 57 and accompanying text.
9 Lidz & Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care, in 2 President's
Commission, supra note 1, at 317-410; Appelbaum & Roth, Treatment Refusal in Medical
Hospitals, in 2 President's Commission, supra note I, at 411-77.
10 Lidz & Meisel, supra note 9.
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[2] "Decisions" are not made by patients. "Recommendations"
are made by doctors to patients.
[3] "Consent" does not exist. Instead what we find is "acquies-
cence," the absence of "objection," or occasionally a "veto."l1
In light of these findings, the results of the Harris poll become
suspect, if not irrelevant. By taking the Harris poll seriously and by
downgrading the significance of its own observational studies, the
Commission was led to find "that the relationship between physicians
and patients is dynamic, that disclosures are extensive, that under-
standing and satisfaction are high, that decisionmaking is shared
...."12 Putting it this way is too disturbingly reassuring.
The Commission's aspirations "to foster a relationship between
patients and professionals characterized by mutual participation and
... by shared decisionmaking"13 find little historical precedent or
contemporary support in the ethics and practices of the medical pro-
fession,14 and it barely emerges in the common law doctrine of in-
formed consent. IS Such a view is, at best, only that of a small band of
commentators.
To be sure, Anglo-American law and our democratic society
have for centuries espoused a commitment to individual autonomy.16
However, the question of whether citizens' autonomy shall, or can, be
honored once citizens become patients has not been decisively an-
swered in the affirmative. Indeed, in medical and legal practice that
question has been treated largely with angry or ironic disdain. 17
11 Id. at 401.
12 1 President's Commission, supra note I, at 10.
13 Id. at 36.
14 See supra note 3.
15 See Katz, Informed Consent-Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137 (1977);
see also J. Katz, supra note 3, at 48-84 (historical analysis of the legal doctrine of informed
consent).
16 [U]nder a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest right, which
underlies all the others-the right to the inviolability of his person, in other words,
his right to himself-is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right neces-
sarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or eminent . . . to violate
without permission the bodily integrity of his patient ... and [to operate] on him
without his consent or knowledge.
Pratt v. Davis, 118 Il1. App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd, 224 Ill. 300,79 N.E. 562 (1906); see also
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) ("[t]he root premise is the concept, funda-
mental in American jurisprudence, that '[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body' ") (quoting Shloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914», cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,406-07,350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960) ("Anglo-
American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determinalion. It follows that
each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if h~ b< l)f sound mind,
expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical lre3Im~IlI.").
17 For instance, recent statements by physicians show an antipathy toward r<lli~nt auton-
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I. THE REPORT AS A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT
Let me begin by placing in context what my close reading of the
Commission's Report reveals: Inevitable obfuscations emerge when-
ever commissions strive for a consensus report about complex moral
dilemmas.
The strong pull for a consensus document casts a shadow over
this Report as it has over innumerable others. I do not wish to dis-
miss the need for accommodation among members of any commission
so that a reasonable joint report can emerge. Instead, I wish to sug-
gest that in situations where a commission proposes a fundamental
reorientation in ethical practices-in this instance in a profession's
practices that affect the well-being of society in decisive ways-any
attempt at writing only a consensus document invites the danger of
obscuring the problems of, and the obstacles to, implementation. The
Commission's Report begs for the inclusion of majority and minority
views. Morality, I believe, requires the presentation of disparate
views, if only to bring to policymakers' and the public's attention the
complexities of finding solutions to such tragic moral problems as the
ones addressed by this Commission.
My personal views on the morality of individual dissent are not
shared by others who also deserve a respectful hearing. Morris
Abram, the Chairman of the President's Commission, and Susan
Wolf, in reflecting on the work of the Commission, recently argued
that "consensus among commission members [is] essential":
A commission such as this one has only the power of persuasion.
A group performing ethical analysis, with no coercive powers, can-
not be persuasive without internal agreement. Unlike a court or
legislature, which is structured to have effect as long as a majority
agrees, a commission requires agreement that is as close to una-
nimity as possible, to have any effect at all. Without such virtual
unanimity, the commission members simply voice the possible ar-
guments; with it, the commission can persuade. is
My differences with the Commission's Chairman deserve careful
omy. See, e.g., Coleman, Terrified Consent, 2 Physician's World 5, 5 (1974) ("[t)here oughta
be a law against this law"); DeLee, Malpractice and Informed Consent-A Legal Ploy: The
Meaning ofInformed Consent and Why it is a Deterrent to Sound Medicine, 61 Int'I Surgery
331,332 (1976) (informed consent endangers patients' mental and physical life); Laforet, The
Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1579, 1584 (1976) (informed consent "destroys
good patient care"); Ravitch, The Myth of Informed Consent, I Surgical Rounds 7, 8 (1978)
(informed consent can "fill patients with uncertainties or torture them with potentialities how-
ever remote").
i8 Abram & Wolf, Public Involvement in Medical Ethics: A Model for Government Ac-
tion, 310 New Eng. J. Med. 627, 629 (1984).
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study. They have far-reaching implications about the functions that
commissions such as this one are to serve. Our differences powerfully
affect both the content of any final report and, by what is omitted and
compromised, its ultimate value to policymakers, be they legislators
or educators.
In the process of preparing the various drafts of the Report, the
tensions among the Commission staff and between the staff and the
Commissioners must have been formidable. 19 Arriving at an accept-
able consensus document must have been laden with agonizing
choices, which discretion precluded airing. The morality of commis-
sion reports, past and future, requires study of the question whether
societal morality is better served by documenting the complexities in-
herent in any ethical recommendation for the conduct of human af-
fairs than by making light of the complexities ~hrough striving for a
consensus report.
II. OBSTACLES TO SHARED DECISIONMAKING
Powerful resistance and formidable obstacles oppose the Com-
mission's objective of "shared decisionmaking" and deserve to be ad-
dressed with greater candor: (1) the absence of a medical tradition for
patient participation in decisionmaking;2o (2) the lack of a coherent
legal doctrine of informed consent, particularly one that is based on a
thoroughgoing commitment to individual self-determination;21 (3) the
pervasiveness of medical uncertainty;22 and (4) the incapacity of phy-
sicians in today's world to engage patients in a shared decisionmaking
dialogue.23
A. The Absence of Medical Tradition for Patient Participation in
Decisionmaking
Disclosure and consent, except in the most rudimentary fashion,
are obligations alien to medical thinking and practice. Disclosure in
medicine has served the function of getting patients to "consent" to
what physicians want patients to agree to in the first place. Shared
decisionmaking has no tradition in the ethics of medical practice.24
19 See Bayer, Ethics, Politics, and Access to Health Care: A Critical Analysis of the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 303 (1984).
20 See J. Katz, supra note 3, at 1-29.
21 See id. at 48-84.
22 See id. at 165-206.
23 See id. at 130-64.
24 Hippocrates, the revered father of western medicine, admonished physicians to:
[p]erform [their duties] calmly and adroitly, concealing most things from the pa-
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The odd status of the concept of autonomy in medical thought makes
this abundantly clear: Physicians have always insisted that they be
granted autonomy; the idea of patient autonomy, on the other hand,
is not found in the vocabulary of medicine.
In the political arena, in consulting rooms, and in hospitals, phy-
sicians have vigorously championed their prerogative~for autonomous
conduct under the slogan of "freedom from lay control. "25 One does
not need to go back to Hippocrates to document this truth. Morris
Abram has provided us with a vivid and poignant depiction of his
own struggles against the systematic disregard of patient autonomy
that filters down from physicians to the rest of the medical person-
nel-a disregard that occasionally can be overcome if one has the will
to scream loud enough:
I kept fighting through all the fevers and transfusions. I felt I
could only survive it by insisting on control. And there would be
plenty of chances to test my resolve. The personnel assigned to
monitor various functions never coordinated their blood sample re-
quirements on a given day, so they'd come two or three times to
leech my tender, collapsing veins. I finally put my foot down.
"You're not going to take more blood," I shouted. "You take
it once a day. Get together and find out how much you want and
for what purpose, and, goddam it, in the absence of an emergency,
don't you touch my veins. Also, no one's going to draw blood ex-
cept the intravenous nurse team," I said, "because that's all they
do, and they know how to do it."
I got my way in both instances, thereby saving myself consid-
erable pain. I was doing everything I could to avoid being an inva-
lid, or a good patient. 26
By dint of strength of personality and legal eminence, Abram, unlike
most patients, succeeded in avoiding being disregarded. He refused to
succumb to being "a good patient"-that is, being a "good" child
who is seen but not heard-or to being treated as an "invalid," an-
other metaphor for an obedient child.
According to medical tradition, however, good patients surren-
der their autonomy. Let me repeat, because only once we take notice
does it strike us as odd: There is no concept of patient autonomy in
medicine. As the Commission Report observed, "[m]edical skepti-
tient while you are attending to him. Give necessary orders with cheerfulness and
serenity, turning his attention away from what is being done to him; sometimes
reprove sharply and emphatically, and sometimes comfort with solicitude and at-
tention, revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condition.
2 Hippocrates, Decorum 297, 299 (W. Jones trans. 1967).
25 See J. Katz, supra note 3, at 30-47.
26 M. Abram, The Day is Short-An Autobiography 209 (1982) (emphasis added).
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cism of patients' capacities for self-determination can be traced to the
time of Hippocrates."27
The Commission refers to records of daily medical practice that
reveal "distinct 'indigenous medical traditions' of truth telling and
consent-seeking, grounded on the theory that such knowledge 'had
demonstrably beneficial effects on most patients' health.' "28 This ob-
servation misinterprets history.
First, as Richard C. Cabot's writings on truthtelling clearly
demonstrate, truthtelling only serves the purpose of reinforcing pa-
tients' "trust" and physicians' authority by establishing a more honest
relationship between physicians and patients.29 As I have written
elsewhere,30 the importance that Cabot, and for that matter Benjamin
Rush and John Gregory,
assigned to trust was based on [their] conviction[s] that good medi-
cal custody required it, and not that patient liberty dictated
it.
. . . Since trust between physicians and patients is a requisite
for joint decision making, [Cabot and others] addressed one of the
necessary preconditions for mutual deliberations. [They] did not
take a next step: to advocate that physicians and patients make
decisions jointly.31
Second, "consent-seeking" throughout medical history bears lit-
tle, if any, relationship to what the President's Commission advocates
under the rubric of "shared decisionmaking." Consent-seeking was
not based on ideas of equality, liberty, and/or autonomy. Instead, it
was grounded in the proposition, as Talcott Parsons put it, that "the
doctor-patient relationship has to be one involving an element of au-
thority-we often speak of 'doctor's orders.' "32 Consent-seeking
meant obedience to doctors' orders, saying "yes," or remaining silent,
and by such silence indicating acquiescence; but no more than that.
It is important to keep this history in mind. Otherwise, the enor-
mity of the task of implementing the noble aspirations of the Commis-
27 I President's Commission, supra note I, at 32.
28 Id. (quoting M. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social His-
tory of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, reprinted in 3 President's Commission, supra
note I, at 1-35). But see J. Katz, supra note 3, at 15-16 (arguing that, historically, truthtelling
was used as a means of manipulating the physician-patient relationship).
29 Cabot, The Use of Truth and Falsehood in Medicine: An Experimental Study, 5 Am.
Med. 344 (1903), reprinted in Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary
Concerns 213 (1977).
30 See J. Katz, supra note 3, at 25-26.
31 Id. at 26.
32 T. Parsons, The Social System 464-65 (1951).
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sion's recommendations will remain unappreciated. When the
Commission speaks of "informed consent ... [as] essentially an ethi-
cal imperative,"33 I agree wholeheartedly. It is, however, an ethical
imperative that comes not from the ethos of medicine, but from else-
where. 34 The traditional ethical imperatives of medicine speak a dif-
ferent language.
Medicine's language and that of the Commission still must be
reconciled. And, although it is not apparent from the Commission's
Report, that reconciliation has to begin at square one. The Lidz and
Meisel study makes this stark fact abundantly c1ear.35 The repeated
reference to the Harris poll only obfuscates this reality; that survey
deserves to be relegated to oblivion.36
If I am correct, then the call for "[c]urricular innovations aimed
at preparing health professionals for a process of mutual decisionmak-
ing with patients"37 will prove to be more difficult to implement than
appearances suggest. At best, only a handful of physician-teachers
have begun this task. Most physician-teachers are not committed to
the value of shared decisionmaking. Whatever courses and seminars
.exist on this topic are taught largely by nonphysicians. And as Derek
Bok recently observed, such courses and seminars "carry a message
that [they] are of slight importance in the total curriculum ... , that
none is important enough to be required of every doctor."38
We must be grateful to the philosophers, bioethicists, lawyers,
ministers, priests, and rabbis who have tried to alert future physicians
to their decisionmaking responsibilities toward patients. But where
have the physician-teachers been? They need to be recruited and
trained.
Physician-teachers must become more involved in preparing
medical students for the challenges of shared decisionmaking. Other-
wise, students will not become sensitized through identification with
their elders to their new responsibilities. To quote Bok once again,
33 1 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 2.
34 The ethical imperative comes from law, see supra note 16, and from philosophy, see,
e.g., I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (H. Paton trans. 1964).
35 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
36 Even though the President's Commission noted that "[r]egarding health care, surveys
are known to overstate the frequency with which information is disclosed and may present a
rosier, more homogeneous picture of medical practice than an on-site investigation," 1 Presi-
dent's Commission, supra note 1, at 9, the Report seems again and again to rely on the Harris
poll in support of the proposition that the physician-patient relationship "is dynamic, that
disclosures are extensive, that understanding and satisfaction are high." Id. at 10.
37 1 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 4.
38 D. Bok, Report to the Harvard Board of Overseers for 1982-83, reprinted in Harv.
Mag., May-June 1984, at 32, 35.
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"physicians will often command greater respect than priests or social
workers in convincing patients [and medical students, I would add] of
the steps they need to follow to cure . . . disease or avoid future
illness."39
I have trained more colleagues from other disciplines than from
medicine; law schools, more than medical schools, have been hospita-
ble to the exploration of issues of professional responsibility. If medi-
cal faculties wish to reverse the historical disregard of patients'
decisionmaking capacities, they cannot complacently turn to the cur-
rent guardians of decisionmaking education. Juvenal understood this
well with respect to chastity:
During Saturn's reign I believe that Chastity still
Lingered on earth . . . .
Thereafter, by slow degrees,
Justice withdrew to heaven, and Chastity went with her.
To bounce your neighbour's bed ... to outrage
Matrimonial sanctity is now an ancient and long-
Established tradition. . . .
I know the advice myoid friends would give-'Lock her up
And bar the doors.' But who is to keep guard
Over the guards themselves?4O
B. The Lack of a Coherent Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent
The President's Commission correctly observed that "[t]he reali-
ties of court decisions on informed consent. . . fall short of the law's
professed commitment to the value of self-determination."41 The
Commission went on to say:
Since "the courts imposed primarily a duty-to-warn on physi-
cians," thereby avoiding a judicial recognition of the proposition
that patients have a decisive role to play in the medical decision-
making process, they have merely reinforced "physicians' tradi-
tional monologue of talking at and not with patients." As a result
39 Id at 39. Bok went on to say:
In the ethos of the contemporary medical school, with its strong emphasis on bi-
omedical science, subjects such as ... patient psychology, ethics, and health care
policy must be required and given ample time if we expect more than a small
minority of students to study them seriously. Faculty members will complain that
there is no room to force these courses into an overstuffed curriculum. . . . Yet
space can and must be found, whether it comes from elective slots or from time
freed up by pruning unnecessary detail from the basic science courses.
Id. at 42.
40 Juvenal, The Sixteen Satires 127, 140 (P. Green trans. 1967) (emphasis added).
41 1 President's Commission, supra note I, at 29.
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they have missed the opportunity to move toward what is needed:
"a new and unaccustomed dialogue between physicians and their
patients . . . in which both, appreciative of their respective ine-
qualities, make a genuine effort to voice and clarify their uncertain-
ties and then to arrive at a mutually satisfactory course of
action. ,,42
In light of the Commission's and other commentators' observa-
tions, it is quite apparent that the call for "shared decisionmaking," a
felicitous phrase adopted by the Commission, has only created an at-
mosphere in which shared decisionmaking has the potential to survive
and grow. The doctrine has not yet provided a meaningful blueprint
for implementing patient self-determination.
Nevertheless, the Report goes on to say that "[t]he Commission
encourages, to perhaps a greater degree than is explicitly recognized
by current law, the ability of patients and health care professionals to
vary the style and extent of discussion from that mandated by this
general presumption."43 There is no "perhaps" about the Commis-
sion's contention, for the Commission correctly asserts on the next
page of its Report that "its description of mutual participation and
shared decisionmaking sets a high ideal."44 It is an ideal, however, to
which the legal doctrine has paid only lipservice.
It is understandable that the Commission did not wish to under-
score its radical departure from the informed consent doctrine and
chose to highlight instead the minimal requirements for shared deci-
sionmaking embedded in the doctrine.4s Any forthright acknowledg-
ments of this departure might have led physicians to appreciate that
the supposedly onerous obligations of disclosure and consent imposed
by common law judges are not as onerous as they have been perceived
42 Id. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
43 Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 39.
4S While the idea of informed consent emerged out of recognition that patients de-
serve a greater voice in medical decision-making, the single-minded emphasis on
risk-disclosures and, to a lesser extent, on alternatives, made this objective unat-
tainable. For mere disclosure does little to expand opportunities for meaningful
consent, particularly in surrender-prone medical settings, unless patients are also
seen as potential participants in medical decisions affecting their lives. This is not
the view of physicians who instead see themselves as ultimate decision-makers. By
limiting the ostensibly new disclosure duties to traditional medical practices,
judges did little to shake this view.
Katz, supra note 15, at 172-73. For shared decisionmaking to be meaningful, as advocated by
the President's Commission, courts must inquire not so much whether a particular disclosure
has or has not been made, but rather whether "the nature and quality of the entire give-and-
take process" between physician and patient was a joint undertaking and led to a meeting of
two minds. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
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to be.46 Physicians' resistance to shared decisionmaking might have
stiffened, and longstanding professional attitudes against disclosure
and consent might have received support from a newly discovered
friend-law-which for decades has been seen as an adversary
instead.47
It is equally understandable that the Commission wished to un-
derscore the symbolic significance of its call for "shared decisionmak-
ing" in order to nag, prod, and disturb the medical profession.
Perhaps it felt that doing so would ultimately improve the climate of
physician-patient decisionmaking.
Whatever the reasons, the Commission adopted a strategy of ob-
scuring the differences between the legal doctrine of informed consent
and its objective of "shared decisionmaking."48 I wish the Commis-
sion had made it clearer that its Report addresses not, as its subtitle
suggests, "the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in
the Patient-Practitioner Relationship," but rather the ethical implica-
tions ofshared decisionmaking in the patient-practitioner relationship.
Distinguishing between the legal doctrine of informed consent
and "shared decisionmaking" would have alerted physicians that the
legal doctrine is a confusing patchwork of contradictory themes.49
46 The total absurdity of the [doctrine of] ... informed consent is a self-contradic-
tory absurdity mitigated only by the obvious piety of the wish that the patients
. . . might fully understand what is being proposed.. . . However, there is no way
that I can see that a parent can arrive at a proper judgment as to whether an infant
with Hirschsprung's disease is to be treated by the Swenson, the Duhamel or the
Soave operation . . . .
Ravitch, supra note 17, at 7. "Our patients routinely comment, 'I don't want to know,' 'Don't
tell me' or 'I need it anyway.' Despite their protests we persist with a potentially frightening
dissertation for 'legal reasons.''' Kaplan, Greenwald, & Rogers, Neglected Aspects of In-
formed Consent, 296 New Eng. J. Med. 1127, 1127 (1977).
47 See supra note 17.
48 Compare 1 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 29 ("[t]he realities of court deci-
sions on informed consent thus fall short of the law's professed commitment to the value of
self-determination"), and id. at 30 ("[c]urrent law serves the important purpose of encouraging
health care professionals to disclose important facts to patients . . . . The law also serves a
critical moral and educative role in proclaiming (even if not always fully enforcing) the value
of self-determination."). Insufficiently emphasized and explicated, although hinted at, are
law's minimal requirements for informed consent. In not giving them the deserved emphasis,
the confused state of the informed consent doctrine was not brought clearly to physicians'
attention. See infra note 49.
49 For example, in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,409-10,350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960),
the court established a disclosure standard based on the practices of a "reasonable medical
practitioner," while in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972), the court declared "[r]espect for the patient's right of self-determination on [a]
particular therapy demands a standard set by law for a physician rather than one which physi-
cians mayor may not impose on themselves." Id. at 784 (footnotes omitted). There is a
similar confusion with regard to establishing the necessary causal connection between a physi-
cian's failure to adequately inform the patient and the patient's decision whether or not to
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The Commission then could have observed not merely that the in-
formed consent doctrine "is only dimly perceived . . . and perhaps
even misunderstood"50 by physicians, but also that doctors have good
reasons to dimly perceive and misunderstand it. I have been a student
of the doctrine for years, and I do not understand it, if understanding
means more than merely identifying its confusing and contradictory
pronouncements and prescriptions.
On the other hand, "shared decisionmaking," the Commission's
prescription, is a much more coherent statement of the scope of physi-
cian-patient decisionmaking. It builds on the idea of patient self-de-
termination that underlies informed consent-an idea that judges
quickly lost sight of as they translated the idea of self-determination
into their doctrine of informed consent.51 It is important to appreciate
fully that the Commission advocates not only a radical break with
longstanding medical practices, but with case law as well. I applaud
the Commission's move. The beleaguered status of shared decision-
making, however, deserves emphasis so that the new vision champi-
oned by a small band of commentators, and now by the President's
Commission, can emerge more clearly and be subjected to scrutiny.
C. The Pervasiveness of Uncertainty
I have written elsewhere about the pervasiveness of medical un-
certainty and suggested that, in this age of medical science, uncer-
tainty of knowledge is no longer as significant an obstacle, either to
shared decisionmaking or to disclosure and consent, as is the reluc-
tance and inexperience of physicians in coping better with uncer-
tainty.52 Moreover, the problem is not the difficulty of
communicating uncertainty to patients, but rather physicians' lack of
forego treatment. The Canterbury court opined that the question for the jury is not what the
patient would have decided to do had the physician adequately informed him, but "what a
prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed." Id. at 791.
On the other hand, the court in Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979), stated that the
Canterbury court's" 'reasonable man' approach. . . severely limits the protection granted an
injured patient. ... If [the patient] testifies he would not [have agreed to the proposed treat-
ment], then the causation problem must be resolved by examining the credibility of[his] testi-
mony." Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
50 1 President's Commission, supra note I, at 17 (emphasis added).
51 For example, in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), the court,
while basing the informed consent doctrine on Anglo-American law's "premise of thorough-
going self-determination," id. at 406, 350 P.2d at 1104, immediately limited disclosures to the
practices of "a reasonable and prudent medical doctor of the same school of practice as the
defendant under similar circumstances." Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107. Thus, when the court's
impulse to foster individual self-determination collided with the equally strong desire to main-
tain the authority of the professions, the former was given all too short shrift.
52 J. Katz, supra note 3, at 165-206.
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training for uncertainty. The problem is for doctors to confront more
honestly diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainties and, in turn, ac-
knowledge them to patients as an integral aspect of their treatment
recommendations.
The physicians' disregard of uncertainty, not in theory but in in-
teraction with patients, is telling proof that doctors have been trained
and socialized not for coping with uncertainty, but for substituting
certainty instead. 53 The posture of certainty is reinforced by the tradi-
tional authoritarian interaction-inimical to shared decisionmaking-
that pervades physician-patient relations and that doctors seek to fos-
ter. Professing certainty serves to maintain professional power and
control over the medical decisionmaking process. Physicians' power
and control is maintained not only by projecting a greater sense of
certainty than is warranted, but also by leaving patients in a state of
uncertainty, not in the sense of shared uncertainties but in the sense of
keeping patients in the dark.54
The disregard of uncertainty defeats sharing the burdens of deci-
sion with patients.55 Such disregard has significantly contributed to
the duplicities, evasions, and lies that readily permeate conversations
53 Id. at 184-86. But see Fox, Training for Uncertainty, in The Student-Physician 207
(1957) ("as time goes on, a student begins to develop effective ways of dealing with ... forms
of uncertainty, so that, gradually, he becomes more capable of meeting them with the compe-
tence and equipoise of a mature physician").
54 See Waitzkin & Stoeckle, The Communication of Information about Illness: Clinical,
Sociological, and Methodological Considerations, 8 Advances Psychosomatic Med. 180,
185-89 (1972).
55 In Haley v. United States, 739 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1984), a court, for the first time,
addressed the obligation of physicians to disclose uncertainty:
[N]either [physician] adequately disclosed his uncertainty about whether [the pa-
tient] had Crohn's disease or ulcerative colitis. Dr. Jay Katz, the leading authority
on the doctrine of informed consent, has written,
"All professions possess esoteric knowledge that, in its totality, is difficult
to learn, understand, and master. Indeed, the complexity of professional
knowledge commands the laity to listen carefully to experts. It does not nec-
essarily suggest, however, that this knowledge cannot be communicated to, or
understood by, patients. Nor does it suggest that professionals should decide
how to proceed without consulting patients, particularly if alternatives are
available and treatment is beset by much uncertainty. These considerations
become even more relevant if it is also correct, as I believe it is, that physi-
cians have during this century acquired a greater capacity than they had here-
tofore to make distinctions between what they know, do not know, and what
is as yet unknowable; that they have acquired the capacity, paradoxical as it
may sound, to talk more knowledgeably about their ignorance."
J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 92 (1984). For [the patient] to
appreciate the risks associated with rectal surgery she had to be apprised that the
doctors were only speculating about the possibility of cancer.
Id. at 1506-m.
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with patients. Such disregard makes meaningful disclosure and con-
sent a charade.
Unless physicians learn to deal better with uncertainty,56 unless
future physicians become better trained for uncertainty, shared deci-
sionmaking will not become a meaningful reality. Training for uncer-
tainty is one of the most pressing assignments confronting medical
educators, an assignment for which no committed and respected place
has been found in the curriculum.
D. The Incapacity ofPhysicians to Engage Patients in a Shared
Decisionmaking Dialogue
My all too brief discussion of uncertainty has alluded to the fact
that coping with uncertainty may be more a problem for physicians
than for patients. If I am correct, doctors' disregard of uncertainty-
and not patients' incapacity to understand-eonstitutes the initial bar-
rier to shared decisionmaking. Indeed, it is not at all clear how much
patients' alleged incapacities are a consequence of physicians' lack of
training for communicating uncertainty to their patients.
Shared decisionmaking will not become a reality until physicians
disabuse themselves of their collective fantasy that they do initiate
discussions about uncertainty of diagnosis and that they do initiate
discussion about uncertainty as to what constitutes the best treat-
ment. 57 Change will only come about if doctors confront, and then
alter, the current reality-so well depicted in the Lidz and Meisel
study58-that "[e]ven when there is a high degree of uncertainty
about a patient's problem, ... [the] medical personnel trie[s] to con-
vey a sense of certainty rather than subtle information about the ill-
ness and its treatment."59 How to supply information about
uncertainty requires a massive effort at reeducating physicians and
giving patients a greater appreciation of the uncertainties that haunt
the practice of scientific medicine.
Before physicians can acquire the capacity to share the burdens
of decision with patients, many problems will require exploration. I
have selected two that are closely related to uncertainty: the tension
between intervention and delay, and the management of patients'
transferences.
56 See J. Katz, supra note 3, at 142-54, 189-99.
S7 The Harris poll suggested that 90% of physicians believe they initiate discussion about
uncertainty of diagnosis and 66% believe they initiate discussion about uncertainty of treat·
ment. 1 Presidenfs Commission, supra note 1, at 87.
S8 Lidz & Meisel, supra note 9, at 317-410.
S9 I President's Commission, supra note I, at 89.
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1. Intervention or Delay
Physicians' pervasive failure to acknowledge uncertainty to pa-
tients is influenced by medicine's considerable ignorance of the respec-
tive contributions that vis medicatrix naturae-the healing power of
nature-and physician's interventions make to the healing process.
These uncertainties in medical knowledge raise a most vexing ques-
tion: When is nonintervention just as salutary as intervention?
Traditionally, doctors have resolved this question by resorting to
action on the assumption that doing something is better than doing
nothing and that errors of commission are less reprehensible than er-
rors of omission.6O Acting on such assumptions in the face of uncer-
tainty relieves the tension of living with the possible, yet unknown,
harmful consequences of delay, since harm caused by mistakes of in-
tervention can more readily be ascribed to the natural progression of
the underlying disease process. Thus, particularly in the absense of
any acknowledgment of uncertainty, errors of omission can more eas-
ily be blamed on physicians than can errors of commission. Acknowl-
edgment of uncertainty about intervention or delay to patients, on the
other hand, would compel both doctors and patients to share respon-
sibility for the decision ultimately made.
Physicians have justified their proclivity to intervene on the
ground that patients demand action rather than watchful waiting.
Doctors have overlooked, however, their contributions to the creation
of such "demands" by their own deep-seated preference for resolving
any ambiguity about treatment in favor of intervention. Fostering
such expectations in patients has made acknowledgment of uncer-
tainty about action or delay unnecessary since both parties seem to
share the same preference.
Yet, the preference for treatment over watchful waiting has
many consequences. For example, it can make "patients" out of per-
sons who, with proper education, could rely more on their own self-
healing capacities. It also exposes these "patients" unnecessarily to
the iatrogenic complications of the powerful treatments of modern
medical technology, when either no treatment or a less drastic ther-
apy is a viable alternative.61
The high rate of "unnecessary" surgery and of resort to antibiot-
60 See Scheff, Decision Rules: Types of Error and Their Consequences in Medical Diagno-
sis, 8 Behavioral Sci. 97, 99 (1963).
61 See, for example, the controversy over radical mastectomy versus the employment of
less drastic surgical procedures. Crile, Management of Breast Cancer: Limited Mastectomy,
230 J. A.M.A. 95-99 (1974); Anglem, Management of Breast Cancer: Radical Mastectomy,
230 J. A.M.A. at 99-105 (1974).
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ics and tranquilizers62 bears testimony to physicians' propensity to re-
solve uncertainty and ambiguity through action rather than inaction.
To turn the tide would require a massive reeducation of physicians
and patients. Both must learn that there is considerable value in liv-
ing with uncertainty and not resolving it preemptorily in favor of in-
tervention. Delay imposes its own risks to life and health and also
imposes considerable economic costs to individuals and society; but so
does action, and perhaps to an even greater extent. Lest I be misun-
derstood, let me note that I favor neither intervention nor delay, but
only the proposition that both are meaningful alternatives and that
ultimately a patient must make the choice as to which route to follow.
2. Transference
Shared decisionmaking requires an appreciation of one particular
set of irrational feelings-transference-that patients bring to their
encounter with doctors. The term transference encompasses the pa-
tients' proclivity to endow their doctors with the characteristics of
patients' earliest caretakers rather than to appraise the capabilities of
physicians more realistically.63 The process of transference leads pa-
tients to project onto the doctor all kinds of magical expectations,
hopes, and fears that are intrinsically irrational because they emerge
out of the confusion of past with present and of fantasy with reality.
These irrationalities manifest themselves most dramatically in
the overvaluation of the physician as an omnipotent healer. The ubiq-
uitous emergence of such feelings in all physician-patient interactions
bears testimony to the existence of psychological vulnerabilities inher-
ent in human beings that only become magnified in the presence of
uncertainty over health and cure. Patients' basic modes of expression
of such feelings are in many ways predictable and stereotypical, but
transference's subtler manifestations also reveal facets of an individ-
ual's uniqueness and essence, of his or her personality, as it has
evolved in interactions with parents and other important persons dur-
ing childhood years. Thus, manifestations of transference constitute a
mixture of highly individualized personal reactions as well as univer-
sal human adult and childlike longings that possess both rational and
irrational components. Transferences can guide and misguide per-
62 See, for example, the controversy over the rush to coronary-artery bypass surgery,
Braunwald, Effects of Coronary-Artery Bypass Grafting on Survival, 309 New Eng. J. Med.
1181 (1983); Braunwald, Coronary-Artery Surgery at the Crossroads, 297 New Eng. J. Med.
661 (1977); McIntosh & Garcia, The First Decade of Aorto-Coronary Bypass Grafting,
1967-1977: A Review, 57 Circulation 405 (1978), or unnecessary intervention in pediatric
practice, Bakwin, Pseudodoxia Pediatrica, 232 New Eng. J. 1yfed. 691 (1945).
63 See J. Katz, supra note 3, at 142-47.
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sons; the latter mostly in times of stress, when infantile hopes and
fears surface most insistently.
If physicians were to acquire a greater appreciation of these
proclivities, it would prevent their being seduced by their patients'
apparent initial willingness to submit unconditionally to their "par-
ent-doctors." Instead, doctors might take greater care to avoid disap-
pointments, engendered by magical hopes, by challenging patients'
unquestioning readiness to put themselves in their doctors' hands. If
physicians were to recognize that patients' magical expectations must
be moderated by confronting patients with medical realities, then phy-
sicians might more carefully combine expressions of hope with a more
realistic appraisal of patients' medical conditions.
Physicians also need to appreciate that they are not only the vic-
tims of these transferences, but their abettors as well. Because they
have been as blind to the existence of transference as have their pa-
tients, doctors have encouraged and augmented patients' transference
feelings by unwittingly promising more than they can deliver, or by
not confronting their patients' explicit and implicit unrealistic expec-
tations. An essential precondition for more effective communication
is a greater awareness by both parties of the power of transference and
the obligation to contain its power. Initially, this obligation must be
assumed by professionals rather than by their patients. Patients can
learn of the power of transference only over time and through per-
sonal experiences with aware physicians who educate them about its
manifestations.
Awareness could lessen physicians' temptation to contribute to
the regressive pull either actively, by treating patients as children, or
passively, by keeping patients in the dark and not inviting their
participation in decisionmaking. Indeed, patients' transference reac-
tions have reinforced physicians' traditional view of patients' incom-
petence. Under the domination of transference, patients appear more
childlike than they actually are or necessarily need to be. Physicians
have been blinded by these ubiquitous and spontaneous manifesta-
tions of transference and have not fully appreciated that patients are
not children.
If doctors were more aware of transference, they would more
readily discern that, manifestations of childlike behavior notwith-
standing, the patient is a mature adult. Doctors would then be more
inclined to learn how to address and nurture the intact, mature ele-
ments of a patient's functioning and how to reverse the regressive pull
engendered by illness and its attendant anxieties. Anna Freud tried to
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teach these lessons of transference to students at Case Western Re-
serve Medical School by reminding them that:
The patient. . . will do his best to push you into the place of pa-
rental authority, and he will make use of you as parental authority
to the utmost. You must understand that. On the other hand, you
must not be tempted to treat him as a child. You must be tolerant
towards him as you would be towards a child and as respectful as
you would be towards a fellow adult, because he has only gone
back to childhood so far as he's ill. He also has another part of his
personality which has remained intact, and that part of him will
resent it deeply, if you make too much of your authority.64
Misled by the phenomenon of transference, physicians have
thought that patients had wanted them to assume complete authority
and, therefore, have issued orders. When their orders made patients
even more childlike-submissive or obstreperous-doctors did not
separate the contributions that the disease, the physician, and the pa-
tient made to the regression. Traditional patterns of interaction be-
tween physician and patient have made childlikeness a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Reconciling respect for self-determination with respect for pa-
tients' adult and childlike longings is a difficult undertaking. How to
achieve such a reconciliation through shared decisionmaking requires
intensive study, and then, in fidelity to the Hippocratic Oath, a com-
mitment to "[imparting] a knowledge of the Art to [our] own sons"65
(and daughters, I would add). .
III. WELL-BEING AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Before concluding, let me comment on the Commission's asser-
tion that informed consent is based on two values: well-being and self-
determination.66 While reading the earlier chapters of the Report, I
was uncertain whether the Commission limited "well-being" to health
related issues or also included under its rubric the well-being that can
accrue to persons from being active participants in decisions that af-
fect their lives in such decisive ways. If employed in the latter sense,
the inclusion of well-being as an aspect of self-determination would
seem justified, although it would have introduced new complications.
But later on, the Report made it clear that well-being is only meant in
64 A. Freud, The Doctor-Patient Relationship (Oct. 29, 1964) (unpublished manuscript),
reprinted in J. Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings: The Authority of the Investigation,
Subject, Professions, and State in the Human Experimentation Process 635, 637 (1972).
65 Oath of Hippocrates, reprinted in Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary 465 (1st
ed. 1951).
66 I President's Commission, supra note I, at 41.
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the former sense: "[T]he absence of self-determination [does not inter-
fere] with the promotion of the patient's well-being."67 Why in-
formed consent-the obligation to disclose information and seek
patients' consent-should be based on the value of physical well-be-
ing, the Commission did not discuss at length.
The conjunction of well-being and self-determination as values
underlying informed consent is unfortunate. It led the Commission to
recommend that "possibly competing considerations of well-being
and self-determination [must be balanced, and that] the prudent
course is to take into account the potential consequences of the pa-
tient's decision."68 Since it is the physician's task to take well-being
into account, the Commission returns us to the days before the case of
Canterbury v. Spence 69 by resurrecting under the balancing test the
medical standard of care and the therapeutic privilege with respect to
decisionmaking.70
Yet, the Commission also realized both that "no objective medi-
cal criteria [exist] that specify a single best way to achieve the goal [of
promoting health]"71 and that "[w]hich treatment is better can be un-
clear, even to a physician."n Giving well-being equal status with self-
determination-in the absence of any objective criteria of what consti-
tutes health, in the presence of pervasive medical uncertainty, and in a
climate of medical authoritarianism~an only reinforce physicians'
proclivities to remain stuck in the mire of making decisions, not by
sharing the burdens of decisions with patients, but by invoking "the
best interest" test, now called the "well-being" test.
I share the Commission's concern about patients' well-being, but
the Commission went too far in its defense by asserting, for example,
that "the well-being principle circumscribes the range of alternatives
offered to patients: informed consent does not mean that patients can
insist upon anything they might want."73 Although patients should
not, of course, be able to insist upon any treatment they choose, their
wishes ought to be heard, not stifled by circumscribing the range of
alternatives offered them. In today's medical world it is too danger-
ous a recommendation.
Equally problematic is another suggestion that emerges from the
67 Id. at 45.
68 Id. at 60.
69 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
70 See supra note 49.
71 1 President's Commission, supra note I, at 42.
72 Id. at 43.
73 Id.
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Commission's discussion of "standards for assessing [decisionmaking]
capacity":
When little turns on the decision, the level of decisionmaking ca-
pacity required may be appropriately reduced (even though the
constituent elements remain the same) and less scrutiny may be
required about whether the patient possesses even the reduced level
of capacity. Thus a particular patient may be capable of deciding
about a relatively inconsequential medication, but not about the
amputation of a gangrenous limb.74
Such a prescription can be read, however much unintended by
the Commission, as allowing patients to make "inconsequential" but
not important decisions. Concern over "well-being" can readily oblit-
erate concern for self-determination. In light of the Commission's
ideal of "shared decisionmaking," I believe that it did not wish to be
so misread. Yet it will be.
Well-being is modified by the Commission in two ways: ''personal
well-being" and ''patient well-being." I have already alluded to the
change in physicians' perception of, and attitudes toward, persons
once they are labelled patients. If they were viewed as autonomous
before, they no longer are. Thus, physicians' concern over patient
well-being tends to obliterate concern over personal self-
determination.
Perhaps at some time in the future, when patient autonomy has
found a respected place in the ethos of medicine, well-being and self-
determination can be juxtaposed as the two values underlying in-
formed consent. That day, however, is far away, at best. Physicians
will first have to become more sensitive to how their own perceptions
of themselves and their patients affect their respective commitment to
the values of self-determination and well-being. One lay commenta-
tor's observations, generally shared by doctors, illustrate the problem:
Recently, I wrote out what I espouse as the standard governing
informed consent between doctor and patient, and the philosophy
that lies behind it. In fact, I believe that the skillful doctor, meta-
phorically speaking, throws out a rope to the patient drowning in
illness and by encouraging the patient to hold on furthers the heal-
ing process.75
With respect to "well-being," the metaphor may be apt. With respect
to self-determination, however, both physician and patient often begin
at sea, and only after having engaged in the process of shared deci-
sionmaking may both regain common and firm ground. Any mean-
74 Id. at 60.
75 M. Abram, supra note 26, at 116.
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ingful "standard governing informed consent" must clearly
distinguish between these two disparate issues.
I suggest that shared decisionmaking be based only on the value
of self-determination. The Canterbury court moved in that direction
by stating that the doctrine must be grounded in "[t]he root premise
... , fundamental in American jurisprudence, that '[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body.' "76 That the court then departed
from its root premise is another matter. Indeed, its departure was
probably motivated in part by concerns similar to those of the Com-
mission about protecting patients' well-being when their choices seem
contrary to their perceived medical interest. Under these circum-
stances the Canterbury court believed that autonomy and self-deter-
mination should yield to well-being.
Autonomy, as I have written elsewhere, is a complex concept.77
It incorporates human beings' simultaneous proclivities for conscious
and unconscious, rational and irrational thought and action. Thus,
assuring physicians' and patients' optimal exercise of conscious and
rational autonomous conduct requires the searching dialogue that the
idea of "shared decisionmaking" seeks to foster.
Respect for psychological autonomy requires that both parties pay
caring attention to their capacities and incapacities for self-deter-
mination by supporting and enhancing their real, though precari-
ous, endowment for reflective thought. In conversation with one
another, patients may uncover mistaken notions about their dis-
eases and their treatment that they have held for a long time or
have recently acquired through misunderstanding the import of
their doctors' recommendations. Physicians may uncover the fact
that their unconscious preferences and biases compelled patients to
yield to their recommendations even though consciously they had
intended otherwise. Without conversation, individual self-determi-
nation can become compromised by condemning physicians and
patients to the isolation of solitary decision making, which can
only contribute to abandoning patients prematurely to an ill-con-
sidered fate. 78
At the same time, patients' ultimate choices deserve to be
honored except under the rarest of circumstances.79 The psychologi-
cal dynamics underlying shared decisionmaking require the utmost
76 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914».
77 J. Katz, supra note 3, at 104-29.
78 Id. at 128.
79 For a discussion of when patients' choices should not be honored, see id. at 156-63.
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respect for patient autonomy with regard to choice; otherwise, the
value of well-being all too readily compromises the value of self-
determination.
It is far better to assign the value of well-being a subordinate
place in the informed consent or, better yet, shared decisionmaking
process. The Commission, I believe, struggled with this proposition
and came close to adopting a similar view:
Given . . . the frequent absence of objective medical criteria and
the legitimate subjective preferences of patients, - ascertaining
whether a health care intervention will, if successful, promote a
patient's well-being is a matter of individual judgment. Societies
that respect personal freedom usually reach such decisions by leav-
ing the judgment to the person involved. 80
The Commission might have based shared decisionmaking solely
on the value of self-determination if it had been as concerned as I am
with the following problems. First, physicians are as vulnerable to the
impact of unconscious and irrational influences on their recommenda-
tions as patients are vulnerable to the impact of these influences on
their choices. The absence of "objective medical criteria" as to what
constitutes well-being only aggravates this problem. Second, the in-
terests of physicians and patients do not necessarily coincide. Their
objectives can differ, particularly as long as alternative medical treat-
ments, including no treatment, pose risks and confer benefits-
whether physical, emotional, economic, or spiritual. Third, the lack
of any medical tradition of shared decisionmaking, coupled with the
conviction that doctors are the appropriate guarantors of patients'
well-being, requires the sharpest possible separation between the val-
ues of self-determination and well-being; otherwise, the latter will all
too readily swallow the former.
I attempted to deal with these issues in The Silent World ofDoc-
tor and Patient 81 out of regard for shared decisionmaking, a concern
similar to that of the Commission. There I introduced distinctions
between thinking about choices and choice, and I suggested that phy-
sicians and patients are obligated to participate in the process of
thinking about choices but that choices are largely for patients to
make and must be honored. 82 Thinking about choices should be con-
ducted in the spirit of better understanding physicians' and patients'
expectations and differences, and not in the spirit of assessing compe-
tence, particularly as long as that assessment remains a unilateral and
80 1 President's Commission, supra note 1, at 43.
81 J. Katz, supra note 3, at 85-164.
82 Id. at 105-29.
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not a bilateral exploration of the physician's and the patient's compe-
tence. The entire notion of competence assessment ought to be dis-
carded and replaced by the ideas of mutual exploration of difference
in expectations, mistaken notions of misunderstandings, and much
more.
To be sure, safeguarding the value of well-being will occasionally
require overruling patients' choices. No principle can rule absolutely,
including the principle of freedom of choice. Yet, exceptions must be
narrowly circumscribed and justified.83 Such fateful decisions must
be made with clear recognition, not that two values are being bal-
anced, but that one is undermined out of respect for another. What I
propose is not of small moment, for it moves respect for autonomy to
center stage; it celebrates "shared decisionmaking" without allowing
it to become compromised ab initio.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, I want to return to the beginning of this Article. I
applaud and admire the Commission's bold and noble vision. The
concerns I have expressed only seek to draw attention to the formida-
ble obstacles that stand in the way of implementation. These obsta-
cles must be addressed bluntly, slowly, carefully, unflinchingly, and in
depth; for otherwise the vision will remain a mirage.
To accomplish all of that requires a committed effort that will
take time. I urge those who will continue the Commission's work to
proceed slowly. The unsatisfactory state of physician-patient deci-
sionmaking has been with us for too long; it cannot be changed over-
night. Recall the closing lines of an ancient poem by Al-Hariri:
Was man nicht erfliegen kann, muss man erhinken.
. . . Die Schrift sagt, es ist keine Sunde zu hinken
(What we cannot reach flying, we must reach limping.
. . . The books tell us it is no sin to limp).84
83 Id. at 104-29.
84 A free translation of one of the Maqiimiit of AI-Hariri in Die beiden Gulden, 6 Friedrich
Ruckert Werke 21 (C. Beyer trans. 1897).

